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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
SHANE MARK KARTCHNER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 981736-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourth amendment to the federal constitution 
provides: 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the trial court's factual finding that "The 
Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding warrants and the 
defendant responded that he probably did" is clearly erroneous? 
Standard of review. Factual findings are reviewed for 
clear error. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
This subsidiary factual finding is preserved below by Mr. 
Kartchner's motion to suppress (R. 26-7 (motion), 28-31 
(memorandum), 77-81 (memorandum in opposition), 105-124 (reply 
memorandum in support), 84-104 (transcript of 12/30/97 preliminary 
hearing), 184 (transcript of 6/4/98 hearing on motion to 
suppress)). See also Mr. Kartchner's conditional guilty plea, R. 
157-164 (statement of defendant, certificate of counsel, and 
order). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the 
contraband found on Mr. Kartchner was not an improper fruit of an 
illegal suspicionless detention? 
Standard of Review. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress, findings of fact will not 
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991); Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a) (1990). However, in reviewing the 
court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard. Steward, 806 P.2d at 215. 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992). »[T]he 
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure 
of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994) . 
Preserved below by motion to suppress and conditional 
guilty plea. R. 26-7 (motion), 28-31 (memorandum), 77-81 
(memorandum in opposition), 105-124 (reply memorandum in support), 
84-104 (transcript of 12/30/97 preliminary hearing), 184 
2 
( t r a n s c r i p t of 6 / 4 / 9 8 h e a r i n g on m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s ! ; P 1 5 7 - 1 6 4 
( . .-merit ill " Kj f p n d a n t , r p i t if ir«at M ill I MMU'VI mini o r d e r ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Sharif r Id 1.1; Kartchner rfas char' led I >y i nf r iririat i on dated 
October 23, 1997 with possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia stemming from incidents occurring 
o n U C ' L o b e i J H , I " |l" I"" " • " I "I1" K-u.. I I'hni'i rum > 'i-'d I i ^ i i p p r pciq ^ 1 1_ 
evidence seized as a result of his suspicionless investigatory 
stop. R. 26 i; (motion) , 28-31 (memorandum) , 77-81 (memorandum in 
opposition) ] 0 5 12 II (:i : e p ] } n: i: Lemoi andi n: i: i i i l si lpp ID:t: it) 8 1 11 04 
(transcript of 12/30/97 preliminary hearing), 184 (transcript of 
6/4/9R heari rig on mot: on to si ippress) "The motion was denied, R. 
13 6-9 (f indings and conclusions, oi dei , attached as addei ldi in i B ) 
Mx. Kartchner pled conditionally guilty to possession of a 
conti • ulled substance • reservi ng the r:i ght to appeal the denial of 
his motion to suppress . R , 15 ; 1 6 1 (statement • : f def ei idai it, 
certificate of counsel, and order) , Mr, Kartchner was sentenced to 
prisi "in i Jiisfiended pending sdf, i s fart" or*y completion of probation and 
payment of fine. The 12 month jail condition ui probation was 
stayed pending this appeal. R, 171-4 (attached as addendum A). 
I ] i K artcliner i i c • v i a,j »pea] s t: lie deni a 1 of his motion to suppress . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
DepijI , Slif-M i f f Mi" \\t\* I A s h l e , w>t , nn r o u t i n e p a t r o l on 
O c t o b e r l P r 1397 a t 4 : l u f !'l » r a v e l i n g e a s t b o u n d on j y u u S o u t h 
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approaching State Street when he observed Mr. Kartchner standing in 
the road, with a bicycle lying nearby partially in the road. R. 
86, 95-7. Deputy Ashley activated his overhead lights and stopped 
to investigate. R. 86, 97. He asked Mr. Kartchner why he was 
standing in the road, and he replied that "he'd just wrecked on his 
bike" and had lost something. R. 87, 97. Deputy Ashley asked if 
Mr. Kartchner was all right, and he responded affirmatively. R. 
87. Mr. Kartchner declined medical assistance. R. 97. Deputy 
Ashley observed some scrape marks on Mr. Kartchner's elbows. R. 
87, 97. Deputy Ashley advised dispatch of the situation, then 
asked Mr. Kartchner for his name. R. 87-8, 98. 
When asked for his name, Mr. Kartchner "hesitated as if 
he didn't want to give it to me." R. 184:7. Deputy Ashley asked 
him another two or three times, with no response. R. 184:7, --9-10. 
Deputy Ashley testified that he needed Mr. Kartchner's name "so I 
can do a report so that we're not liable later on down the street 
down the road. For that reason I always get their name for the 
report." R. 101. The Deputy told Mr. Kartchner that he needed to 
get his name for his police report. R. 184:10. Deputy Ashley 
testified that, "As a police officer when we ask for information 
we're entitled to have the information. When it's not given then 
I continue my investigation on the information that I needed." R. 
102. 
Having received no response, Deputy Ashley then asked Mr. 
Kartchner if he had a warrant. R. 184:7. Mr. Kartchner said "I 
may have" or "I might have" or "I'm not sure if I have one." R. 
4 
184 : 7 , - - 8 I I II Cull I I:i : K a r t c h n e r t h e n gave t h e d e p u t y h i s name . 
R 1 8 il ; E E:pi i/t:/; r ft si: il e] r t : ] I I I:i : Kartchne] : t- : <= il t: whi ] e he ran 
the warrants check, R 100 184:8, 
Deputy Ashley was i lot going to cite Mr. Kartchner for 
anyl.Ji ing , as 1 le I lad doi le i iot] r?;e<"My, I-: , 1 no , I ""h , 
Kartchner had not committed any traffic violations. R, 102, "The 
warrants check came, back positive. R. 88 Mr. Kartchner was 
ai i ested for ti ie w ai i: ai it 8 8 8 9 P 3 sarch i i i- : :i :i snt t : a:i : i : est: 
revealed methamphetamine and paraphernalia, R. 83-90 At least 
two other police officers and a trainee were present in addition to 
Deputy Ashle> I i! 11 0 3 1 . 
In ruling on Mr, Kartchner's motion, to suppress, the 
trial court made findings and conclusions which include the 
following: 
4. For traffic management and the defendant's safety, 
Deputy Ashley activated his overhead lights and 
exited his vehicle to assist the defendant. 
5. The defendant explained that he had wrecked his 
bicycle on the road. 
6. Despite scrape marks on the defendant's elbows, the 
defendant refused medical assistance. 
7. Based on the refusal of medical treatment, Deputy 
Ashley inquired as to the defendant's name for 
completion of his accident report and the defendant 
refused to provide it. 
8. The Deputy then asked if the defendant had 
outstanding arrest warrants and the defendant 
responded that he probably did. 
9. At that time the Deputy directed the defendant to 
"wait" while he confirmed the existence of 
warrants. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The activation of the Deputy's vehicle's overhead 
lights did not constitute a seizure as its stated 
and obvious purpose was to facilitate public 
safety. 
5 
2. Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy 
his name, coupled with the defendant's admission 
that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants, 
the Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the 
defendant to wait while he checked for the 
existence of warrants. 
R. 137-8. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Kartchner said he 
"probably" had warrants is clearly erroneous. The only witness 
testified to the contrary. In fact, Mr. Kartchner said he "may" or 
"might" or "I'm not sure if I have one." 
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress contraband 
found on Mr. Kartchner. After Deputy Ashley determined that Mr. 
Kartchner did not require medical assistance, his continued 
questioning of Mr. Kartchner in the face of his refusal to give his 
name, together with the surrounding circumstances, constituted a 
fourth amendment seizure without reasonable suspicion. 
Alternatively, even if no seizure occurred until Mr. 
Kartchner was detained pending a warrants check, his refusal to 
give his name coupled with his answer that he "may" have or "might" 
have or "I'm not sure if I have" a warrant did not constitute 
reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense sufficient to justify 
the detention. The fruits of this illegality should have been 
suppressed. The trial court's suppression order should be 
reversed, and the case remanded to allow Mr. Kartchner to withdraw 
his conditional plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT il . THE TRIAL COURT1' S FACTUAL FINDING THAT 
I • . KARTCHNER INDICATED "THAT HE PROBABLY DID" 
HAVE OUTSTANDING ARREST WARRANTS IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Fully marshalled,1 the evidence addressing what Mr. 
Kartchner said, concerning his warrants s*'a:us :; as follows, 
Deputy r Ash ] ey test: £ i * K i J i i I M : i • i e] :i mi i • -•.--;* . 
A: I'm not sure. He told me that he prooably had 
a warrant after I [--] after he hesitated to give me his 
name then he said he may have a warrant, So at: that time 
I advised him,, that I needed to check --.at. 
R . 101. At the suppression hearing, he clarified this testimony: 
A I tl lii lk I asked him [foi ..__- ..^ :ndj i *w or three 
times. Then I asked him if he had a warrant, as a 
question, "Do you have a warrant?" 
Q How did he respond? 
A He said, ["]I may have one, ["" ] something to 
that effect, ["]I might have one.["J 




Q £ _ : ^a 1:11 ., . _ irb, ir^-i , 1 probably 
have warrants. :"'• And ~r r^inr vou said, [,f]Wait 
here whil- I ^._-v 
A Yeah. I don't: Know _i ne sa^a "proc^oly." I 
think ne said, "I may have," or "I'm not sure if I have 
one." So that put a doubt ; r. ~^  • . 1: " r may have 
one . 
R. 184:8 
XE. g. In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P., 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
("An appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support, as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'") 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P 2d 191, 1,93 (Utah 1987)). 
; 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Kartchner indicated 
"that he probably did" have outstanding arrest warrants is so 
lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the 
evidence," thus making it "clearly erroneous." While on one 
occasion Deputy Ashley started to say that Mr. Kartchner indicated 
he probably had warrants, he corrected himself and testified Mr. 
Kartchner indicated he "may" have a warrant. R. 101. At the 
suppression hearing, Deputy Ashley corrected the prosecutor's 
conclusory statement that Mr. Kartchner indicated he probably had 
warrants, and testified to the contrary that "I don't know if he 
said 'probably.'" R. 184:8. If the only percipient witness to 
testify did not know, it is hard to understand how the judge could. 
The trial court's finding is clearly erroneous and must be 
reversed. The evidence firmly establishes that Mr. Kartchner only 
said that "I may have" or "I might have" or "I'm not sure if I have 
one." R. 184:7, --8, R. 101. 
POINT II . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
SUPPRESS THE CONTRABAND FOUND ON MR. KARTCHNER 
AS FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SUSPICIONLESS SEIZURE. 
A. CONTROLLING LEGAL PRINCIPLES. 
The operative legal principles necessary for a 
determination of this case were ably set forth by this Court in 
Truiillo: 
The search and seizure limitations of the 
fourth amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or 
"seizures" that fall short of official arrests. Terry, 
392 U.S. at 16-17, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. A seizure within 
the meaning of the fourth amendment occurs only when the 
officer by means of physical force or show of authority 
8 
has in some way restricted the liberty of a person." 
Mendenhall. 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. at 1876 (citing 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n. 16). 
When a reasonable person, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation 
with the officer's investigation, but because he believes 
he is not free to leave a seizure occurs. Id. at 544, 
555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877. 
The United States Supreme Court has illustrated 
situations which may result in a "seizure": 
Examples of circumstances that might indicate a 
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to 
leave, would be the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's 
request might be compelled. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 (citations 
omitted). 
In contrast, a seizure within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment does not occur when a police officer 
merely approaches an individual on the street and 
questions him, if the person is willing to listen. 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 
1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (citations omitted)." 
However, the person approached is not required to answer 
the officer's questions, Id. at 498-99, 103 S.Ct. at 
1324-25; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 
and his refusal to listen to the officer's questions or 
answer them, without more, does not furnish reasonable 
grounds for further detention. Rover, 460 U.S. at 499, 
103 S.Ct. at 1325. 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-8 (Utah App. 1987). 
Stated differently: 
Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so 
intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person 
would have believed he was not free to leave if he had 
not responded, one cannot say that the questioning 
resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment. But 
if the persons refuses to answer and the police take 
additional steps -- such as those taken in Brown -- to 
obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some 
minimal level of objective justification to validate the 
detention or seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S., at 554, 100 S.Ct., at 1877; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S., at 21, 88 S.Ct., at 1879. 
9 
I.N.S. v. Delaado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-7, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 
(1984) . " [W] hile the police have the right to request citizens to 
answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have 
no right to compel them to answer." Davis v. Mississippi, 3 94 U.S. 
721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); 
accord Delaado, 466 U.S. at 227, 104 S.Ct. at 1768. 
B. MR. KARTCHNER WAS DETAINED FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONING UNSUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION. 
For present purposes, the critical inquiry is whether Mr. 
Kartchner was detained when Deputy Ashley continued to press him to 
reveal his name after his initial refusal to do so, and ran a 
warrants check on him. Mr. Kartchner advances two separate 
theories: (1) that continued questioning under the totality of the 
circumstances when Mr. Kartchner refused to give his name 
constituted a detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion, or 
alternatively (2) that Deputy Ashley did not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain Mr. Kartchner while performing a warrants 
check. 
When Deputy Ashley approached Mr. Kartchner, he activated 
his overhead lights. R. 97, 13 7 (finding 4) . Activation of 
overhead lights is a sufficient show of authority to constitute a 
seizure. In State v. Davis, 821 P.2d.9 (Utah App. 1991), a police 
officer pulled up behind a car stopped by the side of the road. 
This court held that merely pulling up behind the stopped vehicle 
did not effect a detention. Id. at 12. However, "The officer then 
10 
detained Davis by a display of authority when he activated the 
overhead lights on his vehicle." Id. See also State v. Struhs, 
940 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah App. 1997) (activation of lights, in 
conjunction with other factors, supported finding of seizure). But 
see State v. Hanson, 504 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1993) (no seizure where 
officer pulled behind car parked on shoulder and activated lights, 
because a reasonable person "would know that while flashing lights 
may be used as a show of authority, they also serve other purposes, 
including warning oncoming motorists in such a situation to be 
careful") . At this juncture, any detention that may have occurred 
was reasonable. In Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 
1992), this Court outlined the parameters of the community 
caretaker exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment. Community caretaker stops are reasonable when (1) a 
seizure occurs, (2) objectively premised on a bona fide community 
caretaker function, (3) under circumstances evidencing an imminent 
danger to life or limb. Id. at 365. Deputy Ashley testified that 
"I had to stop the traffic so he didn't get run over . . . " R. 86. 
Traffic was fairly heavy. R. 96. His actions were justified at 
their inception. Similarly, his questioning of Mr. Kartchner 
concerning the extent of any injuries and whether medical 
assistance was necessary was appropriately limited in scope to 
community caretaking. 
However, any further detention is problematic: 
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, the seizure does not cease simply because the 
police formulate an uncommunicated intention that the 
seized person may go his or her way. For the seizure to 
11 
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from 
the words of an officer or from the clear import of the 
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about 
his or her business. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 
537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994). 
State v. Hiqqins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994). At no time was 
Mr. Kartchner informed that he was free to leave. 
1. Mr. Kartchner was seized when Deputy 
Ashley continued to press him for 
information after his initial 
refusal to give his name. 
After Mr. Kartchner declined to give his name, a seizure 
occurred (if not earlier) at least as of when Deputy Ashley 
continued to press him for that information. "[W]hile the police 
have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions 
concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to 
answer." Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 89 S. Ct. 
1394, 1397 n.6, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); accord Delcrado, 466 U.S. at 
227, 104 S.Ct. at 1768. 
Deputy Ashley testified concerning his usual practice: 
A: Anytime I do this any kind of accident of this 
sort I did one the day before I always get the name so I 
can do a report so that we're not liable later on down 
the street down the road. For that reason I always get 
their name for the report. Because Mr. Kartchner 
hesitated, acted nervous about giving me his name then I 
continued to try to find out what his name was. 
Q: But you would not let him leave at that point? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: He had the absolute right to get up and go 
didn't he? 
A: Urn, I was just trying to do an investigation of 
not giving me the information I need. 
Q: Now Mr. Kartchner hadn't hit anything else had 
he on his bicycle? 
A: No. 
Q: This bicycle had flipped. He had no[t] 
collided with anyone? 
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A: As a police officer when we ask for information 
we're entitled to have the information. When it's not 
given then I continue my investigation on the information 
that I needed. Down the road if he gave a wrong name 
then I wouldn't be able to give the report I needed to 
give. 
R. 101-2 (emphasis added). 
Deputy Ashley requested Mr. Kartchner's name a total of 
at least 3 or 4 times. R. 184:7, --9-10. While he may have at 
first only asked for Mr. Kartchner's name, Deputy Ashley's 
testimony makes clear that the tone changed at some point to a 
demand. R. 184:10 ("had to have it), 184:9 ("needed to do a report 
and I needed his name") . As of that time, Mr. Kartchner was 
detained. "Examples of circumstances that might indicate a 
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be 
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 
L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (emphasis added). 
In the face of Mr. Kartchner's refusal to give his name, 
Deputy Ashley should have let him go. "When a citizen expresses 
his or her desire not to cooperate, continued questioning cannot be 
deemed to be consensual." Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1253 
(9th Cir. 1993), petition dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 671, 
126 L.Ed.2d 640 (1994) . 
In State v. Gleason, 851 P.2d 731 (Wash. App. Div. 3 
1993), an officer walked up behind Gleason, approached within arms 
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length, and "asked him why he was there and demanded 
identification." Id. at 734. A second officer was getting out of 
the police car at the same time. The court held that there was a 
sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure. 
In United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 
1979) , an officer motioned and called for the appellant and another 
to cross the street towards him. When the companion failed to 
comply, the officer called a second time, "which indicates that the 
pair were not free to continue down the street. Clearly [the 
officer]fs actions constituted a sufficient show of authority to 
restrain appellant's freedom of movement, therefore appellant was 
seized." Id. at 1289. 
State v. Day, 461 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. App. 1990) is also 
illustrative. An officer stopped near the defendant in a filling 
station, exited his car, and summoned the defendant to approach him 
to answer questions. Id. at 406. The court found that a seizure 
occurred: 
We conclude the summoning by the police 
officer, who was in uniform and armed, requiring 
appellant to approach the officer's squad car to provide 
identification and to respond to questioning, constitutes 
a restraint and seizure under the fourth amendment. 
Id. at 407. Accord Barna v. State, 636 So.2d 571 (Fla. App. 4th 
Dist. 1994) (seizure occurred where two men in rear corner of 
parking lot at 11:30 P.M. were approached by police, informed of 
investigation of drug activity, thefts, and burglaries, were asked 
for identification, and warrants check was performed). See 
generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 102-3 (3rd ed. 
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1996) ("On the other hand, an encounter becomes a seizure if the 
officer engages in conduct which a reasonable man would view as 
threatening or offensive even if performed by another private 
citizen." This would include such tactics as pursuing a person who 
has attempted to terminate the contact by departing, C1 continuing 
to interrogate a person who has clearly expressed a desire not to 
cooperate, [] . . .") . 
Here, a reasonable person in Mr. Kartchner's situation 
would not have felt free to leave. He was directly confronted by 
a uniformed, armed officer. The emergency lights on the officer's 
vehicle were activated. His attempt to avoid questioning by the 
officer had been ignored, and the officer continued to press him 
for information.2 He was not free to leave. Mr. Kartchner 
submitted to Deputy Ashley's show of authority. "When a reasonable 
person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in 
the spirit of cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs." 
State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877). 
This suspicionless detention violated Mr. Kartchner's 
fourth amendment rights. Contraband obtained in a search incident 
to arrest should have been suppressed as unattenuated fruit of the 
illegal seizure. United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 
407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
Additionally, backup officers may have been present. R. 103-
4 (indicating that at least 3 other officers were present, but not 
indicating at what time they arrived). 
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2. Alternatively, even Mr. Kartchner's 
statement that he "may" or "might" 
have warrants did not provided 
reasonable suspicion to detain him 
for the warrants check. 
Even if no detention occurred until the warrants check 
was performed, a constitutional violation has still occurred. The 
record is undisputed that Deputy Ashley ordered Mr. Kartchner to 
wait while he ran a warrants check. R. 98-9, 100, 103, 184:8. 
Detention pending completion of a warrants check is a fourth 
amendment seizure. State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d 761, 762-3 (Utah 
1991); State v. Munson. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991), State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
At the time Deputy Ashley detained Mr. Kartchner, he knew 
that Mr. Kartchner had fallen off his bike (R. 87, 97) , that he had 
declined medical assistance (R. 97, 99) , that he had initially 
refused to give his name (R. 88, 99, 184:7), and that he had said 
he "might" or "may" or "I'm not sure if I have" warrants (R. 101, 
184:7, --8). Mr. Kartchner was coherent, stable, and alert. R. 
101. Mr. Kartchner had not committed any traffic violation. R. 
102. Deputy Ashley was not going to cite Mr. Kartchner for 
anything, as he had done nothing incorrectly. R. 100. 
In total, these circumstances fail to rise to the level 
of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as to support a 
detention. No traffic violation had occurred. A refusal to 
cooperate with police does not create reasonable suspicion: 
He may not be detained even momentarily without 
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his 
refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, 
furnish those grounds. United States v. Mendenhall, 
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supra, 446 U.S., at 556, 100 S.Ct., at 1878 (opinion of 
Stewart, J.). 
Rover, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S. Ct. at 1324; accord Truiillo. 739 
P.2d at 88. 
Mr. Kartchner's statement in response to whether he had 
a warrant merely stated a truism: any citizen "may" or "might" or 
may be unsure if they have warrants. The only reliable method of 
determining warrants is to do a warrants check, a task only the 
authorities can perform. Theft of identity has become sufficiently 
widespread that it has recently become a topic of federal 
legislation. The possibility of the existence of a warrant for a 
person of the same name is in itself reason enough to be wary of 
giving your name to police. See, e.g., State v. Wendell Navanick, 
pending before this Court as Case No. 981398-CA (defendant picked 
up on a warrant in his name, although warrant was actually for a 
different individual with the same name). Without more, a 
statement by an individual that he "may" or "might" have warrants 
only states the obvious, and does not raise a reasonable suspicion 
that there is in fact a warrant. 
The trial court relied on its mistaken factual finding 
#8: "The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest 
warrants and the defendant responded that he probably did." As set 
forth in Point I, supra at 7, that factual finding is unsupported 
and against the great weight of the evidence. The evidence only 
establishes that Mr. Kartchner only said he "might" or "may" or 
"I'm not sure if I have" warrants. R. 101, 184:7, --8. The true 
facts do not establish reasonable suspicion. 
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Absent reasonable suspicion, Mr. Kartchner's detention 
was unlawful. Contraband obtained in the search incident to arrest 
should have been suppressed as unattenuated fruit of the illegal 
seizure. United States v. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kartchner respectfully 
requests that the trial court's order denying his motion to 
suppress be reversed, and that the case be remanded to allow him to 
withdraw his conditional plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this * ^  day of February, 1999. 
A 
^Jm 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State Street, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84114-0230, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South 6th Floor, P.O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this // day of 
February, 1999. 
Robert K. Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of February, 1999. 
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ADDENDUM A 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT, R. 171-4 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANE MARK KARTCHNER, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971019499 FS 
Judge: LESLIE LEWIS 
Date: October 2, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: chells 
Prosecutor: MARK S. KOURIS 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RALPH DELLAPIANA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 25, 1960 
Video 
Tape Number: 10:13 am 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/1998 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 971019499 
Date: Oct 02, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Jail time is to run concurrent to the jail time now serving. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of the following: 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE F3 the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 12 month(s) in the. The total time 
suspended for this case is 12 month(s)• 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 58 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE 
The 12 months jail time is stayed until appeal is determined. 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $850.00 
Total Amount Due: $1850.00 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300.00 
Pay to: 
LEGAL DEFENDARS OFFICE 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is granted credit for time served. 
Defendant is granted credit for 58 day(s) served. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $1850.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC, 
Page 2 \-x\ 
Case No: 971019499 
Date: Oct 02, 1998 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Enter into and complete the outpatient Odyssey House treatment 
program. 
No warrant is needed for officer or APPD for searches. 
Full time work after 30 days of completion of the Odyssey House 
Program. May be through temporary agency until full time work can 
be obtained. 
Fine may be reduced or the defendant may do community service work 
hours. This may be determined after the treatment issue has been 
discussed. 
Fine may be reduced as much as 1/2. 
Pay $300.00 recoupment fee. 
Vocational rehabilitation and Mental Health evaluation through 
Odyssey House. 
Case No: 971019499 
Date: Oct 02, 1998 
Dated this Q day of 
LESLIE~ LEWIS: 
District Coufct Judge; ; 
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ADDENDUM B 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, ORDER, R. 136-9 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MARK S. KOURIS, 6594 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on the above captioned matter, was 
heard by this Court on June 4, 1998, at 8:30 A.M. Defendant was present and represented by 
Ralph Dellapiana. The State of Utah was represented by Mark S. Kouris, Deputy District 
Attorney. Testimony was taken by one witness and both parties briefed and argued the pertinent 
issues. Being fully advised, the Court makes the following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The State of Utah charged the defendant by Information of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Methamphetamine; and Unlawful Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia. 
2. The State based its Information on activities occurring on October 18,1997 at 50 
West 3900 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
tiuiD D;S?R;CT COUS? 
JUN 9 1998 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By n o 9m,CLJ& 
Dooutv Cie::; 
iu 
On that date, Sheriff's Deputy Michael A. Ashley traveled eastbound on 3900 
South and noticed the defendant standing on the street at about 50 West. 
For traffic management and the defendant's safety, Deputy Ashley activated his 
overhead lights and exited his vehicle to assist the defendant. 
The defendant explained that he had wrecked his bicycle on the road. 
Despite scrape marks on the defendant's elbows, the defendant refused medical 
assistance. 
Based on the refusal of medical treatment, Deputy Ashley inquired as to the 
defendant's name for completion of his accident report and the defendant refused 
to provide it. 
The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the 
defendant responded that he probably did. 
At that time the Deputy directed the defendant to "wait" while he confirmed the 
existence of warrants. 
The Deputy confirmed outstanding warrants for the defendant and placed him 
under arrest. 
During a search incident to arrest, the Deputy found three small bags of an off 
white powder, a syringe and a glass tube. 
The defendant then admitted that the powder and paraphernalia belonged to him. 
The defendant also admitted that he ingested the substance on two occasions 
earlier that day. 
Deputy Ashley field-tested the powder and it tested positive for the presence of 
methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The activation of the Deputy's vehicle's overhead lights did not constitute a 
seizure as its stated and obvious purpose was to facilitate public safety. 
2. Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled with the 
defendant's admission that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants, the 
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the defendant to wait while he checked 
for the existence of warrants. 
Approved as to form: 
DATED this I day of V j£st~>~^ , 1998 
BY T H g ^ U R T : 
I^SLIE A. LEWIS, Judge 
Kalpn Dellapiana 
Attorney for the Defendant 
HiM^ 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MARK S. KOURIS, 6594 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law based thereon: 
The Court hereby orders that defendanl^Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
Hc/n f ) 
DATED this 7 L 1 _, 1998. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge 
\Vi 
